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Recommendation Detail Rationale Contingencies Page
Set time for private 
members’ business.
Dedicated time in the parliamen-
tary calendar for debate of pri-
vate members’ bills and support 
for the drafting of those bills.
Without set-time for private 
members’ bills the executive 
determines the agenda of the 
parliament, excluding non-gov-
ernment voices particularly.
May require a Agenda 
Committee to manage 
time and ensure it is 
provided. Also may re-
quire more sitting days.
p. 8
Access to public 
service advice for 
members.
Access of elected parliamen-
tarians to the capacities of the 
public service should be en-
hanced. To save resources, this 
should be limited to analysis 
of policy proposals generated 
by members seeking to amend 
draft legislation.
Improves the capacity of all 
members to generate legisla-
tion.
p. 8
Minimum 80 sitting 
days a year.
Guaranteed number of days for 
parliament to sit.
More time is required to allow 
for private members’ bills, 
debates on broader issues and 
debates on committee reports. 
p. 8
Establishment of an 
Agenda Committee.
Equal representation from the 
Government, the Opposition and 
the cross-bench and chaired 
by the independent Speaker to 
schedule the business of the 
House.
Necessary to prevent Govern-
ment control of house business 
and to resolve other procedural 
requirements relating to new 
parliamentary procedures.
Requires an indepen-
dent speaker to be 
most effective.
p. 8
Recommendations 
for ‘free votes’
The Agenda Committee should 
make recommendations about 
issues on which the party whips 
do not need to enforce the party 
line.
More ‘free-votes’ ensures that 
the parliament is reflective of 
its members’ true perspectives 
and values and those of their 
constituents.
Agenda Committee to 
make such recommen-
dations.
p.8
‘Take note’ debates Debates on emerging issues or 
on reports that do not require 
approval or disapproval – to be 
scheduled by the Agenda Com-
mittee.
Allowing early and open debate 
on issues and recommenda-
tions exposes the public to 
greater information and en-
sures that members apply 
appropriate scrutiny to issues. 
All committee reports should 
be the subject of take-note 
debates.
Agenda committee. p. 8
Parliamentary Budget 
and Economic Office
An independent body to provide 
modelling and budgeting advice 
to members.
Allows for private members to 
cost proposals and amend-
ments as they do not have 
access to treasury modelling.
p.9
Independent Speaker A speaker that is not a member 
of the Government or Opposi-
tion.
The management of business 
within the House requires an 
independent umpire to ensure 
that private members’ issues 
can be raised and to also raise 
the standards of Question 
Time. 
p. 9
1
Questions must be 
for information.
Questions in Question Time 
must ask for government infor-
mation, not opinion, comment or 
make unfounded accusations
Focus Question Time on 
Government actions and on ac-
countability.
Independent Speaker 
(to be most effective)
p. 9
Answers restricted to 
four minutes.
Answers in Question Time to be 
restricted to 4 minutes.
To focus answers on the ques-
tions asked and prevent extra-
neous political point-scoring.
Independent Speaker p.9
One Question Time 
per week solely for 
non-Government 
members.
To focus question time on 
Government accountability and 
to limit the number of ‘Dorothy 
Dixers.’
p. 9
Supplementary ques-
tions.
Allow supplementary questions 
by the original questioner and 
other members (three supple-
mentary in total). Time limits on 
both answers and questions.
Accountability and debate 
require responses to be further 
queried by members.
Independent Speaker 
(to be most effective)
p. 9
Debate on replies to 
questions.
Should an answer provide 
important new information to the 
house, a short debate on that 
answer should be allowed under 
the standing orders.
Improves accountability and 
the relevance of questions.
Independent Speaker 
(to be most effective)
p. 9
Empower Commit-
tees to initiate their 
own enquiries. 
Currently parliament as a whole 
directs the work of committees. 
This results in their work being 
directed in the interest of the 
executive.
Allows for emerging issues to 
be considered by parliament. 
Improves the substance of 
work undertaken by commit-
tees.
p. 10
Share Committee 
chairs.
Share Committee chairs equally 
between Government, Opposi-
tion and cross bench members.
Provides a further democratic 
check by allowing non-Gov-
ernment members to initiate 
enquiries.
p. 10
Remove immunity of 
Ministerial staff and 
‘executive privilege’
Remove the present claimed 
immunity of Ministerial staff from 
appearances at parliamentary 
committees and ‘executive privi-
lege’ as a ground to decline to 
produce documents.
To hold the executive account-
able it is imperative that their 
staff are required to give evi-
dence before committees.
More relevant if com-
mittees can initiate their 
own enquiries.
p. 10
Focus committees on 
emerging issues.
Focus Committees on emerging 
issues (like Climate Change and 
the Henry Tax Review) or on 
pre-legislative hearings.
Provides a forum for issues to 
be debated and considered 
before legislation is drafted.
Agenda Committee 
could facilitate this.
p. 10
Executive to respond 
to reports within 30 
days.
Oblige the Executive to respond 
to committee reports within 30 
calendar days.
Provides a further avenue for 
accountability as well as direc-
tion to the executive.
Committees to initiate 
their own enquiries.
p. 10
2
Increase funding for 
committee work.
Resources for the Australian 
parliament should at least match 
the staffing and resource levels 
of the UK House of Commons 
Committees.
For committees to be able to 
instigate proper investigation 
into emerging issues or to hold 
the executive to account they 
need sufficient resources.
p.10
Exposure drafts 
available.
Model the ACT approach in 
requiring exposure drafts of 
all major pieces of legislation. 
These should be available for 
community and stakeholder 
comment.
More transparency and more 
advance discussion of pro-
posed measures are critical to 
achieve more effective govern-
ment.
p.10
‘Macklin’ cut off rule The House and Senate should 
(re)adopt the ‘Macklin cut-off 
rule’, which forces the execu-
tive to give the Senate and the 
House advance notice of bills 
and empowers them to decline 
to consider any bills brought 
forward without early notice, 
for example legislation rushed 
at the end of a parliamentary 
session.
Allows for proper scrutiny of 
bills and for sufficient notice to 
the public of proposed legisla-
tive changes.
Agenda Committee 
could facilitate.
p.10
Only individuals can 
donate to parties.
Only natural persons can make 
donations to political parties or 
candidates.
When corporations and other 
organisations donate large 
sums to political parties it 
undermines public confidence 
in the integrity of those parties 
and candidates and can lead to 
perceived conflicts of interest, if 
not conflicts themselves.
p. 11
Donors above $500 
must declare employ-
ment.
Individual donors who give more 
than a certain threshold (we 
propose $500) would have to 
disclose the name of their em-
ployer to the AEC as a part of 
their donation requirements.
We need to increase transpar-
ency of individual donations to 
make sure corporate money 
isn’t being funnelled through 
individual donations instead.
Prohibition on corpo-
rate donations.
p. 11
Immediate public list-
ing of donations.
All donations above $500 per 
year should be listed publicly 
and immediately (although not 
their employer publicly) – with 
the information updating con-
tinually.
The public has a right to know 
who has donated to which 
campaigns before they vote for 
candidates.
p. 11
Donations to can-
didates capped at 
$1000 per year.
Individual donations should be 
capped at $1,000 a year. 
To prevent any one person or 
organisation having dispropor-
tionate influence in our elec-
toral system.
p. 11
3
Associate member-
ship fees to parties’ 
capped.
Associate members, such as 
trade unions, corporations or 
any other association should 
have their fees limited at $25 
000 per year and should be 
publicly recorded. Such funds 
should be kept to funding the 
administration of political parties 
only, with audits conducted by 
a properly funded investigative 
branch of the AEC.
To prevent organisations do-
nating to parties via member-
ship without public knowledge.
p. 11
All Political organisa-
tions to have dona-
tion caps (third party 
reform). 
Donations to such organizations 
should be capped in the year of 
an election and be allowed to 
come from organizations and 
individuals. There are options 
for determining which organisa-
tions are to be covered.
Any organisation that partici-
pates in public debate should 
be transparent about its fund-
ing so that citizens can assess 
its claims with reference to its 
funding sources.
p. 11
Public funding based 
on a pool per elector-
ate.
Each seat should have a set 
pool of funds for distribution  to 
candidates that receive above 
4% for the vote. This pool of 
funds may differ based on an 
independent assessment of the 
costs of campaigning. Each can-
didate should receive their pro-
portional share. Parties should 
not be allowed to transfer public 
funding accrued through the 
contest of one seat to another 
candidate in another area.
This reaffirms the local nature 
of representation and prevents 
parties harvesting money in 
safe seats and re-directing it to 
marginal seats.
p. 12
Public funding pre-
mium connected to 
donations raised.
Candidate should receive a 
small premium connected to the 
amount of small donations that 
they generate. These cannot be 
claimed by parties but only by 
individual candidates (who may 
be members of parties). 
This would encourage candi-
dates to engage the public and 
to build local movements rather 
than simply rely on the public 
purse alone to raise money. 
p. 12
Government adver-
tising restrictions
Principles relating to the use 
of government funds for public 
advertising must be codified and 
legislated.
To stop incumbent advantage 
and the misuse of public mon-
ies.
p. 13
Electorate mate-
rial subject to similar 
restrictions.
All material distributed by 
members of parliament should 
be subject to scrutiny by an 
appointed officer to ensure they 
meet the standards that apply 
to government advertising as a 
whole.
To stop incumbent advantage 
and the misuse of public mon-
ies.
p. 13
4
Prohibition on access 
to electoral allowanc-
es during campaigns.
From the day the writs are 
issued, members of parlia-
ment should have no access to 
printing allowances or any other 
entitlements (such as postage, 
travel, and telephones)
To stop incumbent advantage 
and the misuse of public mon-
ies.
p. 13
Apply Trade Prac-
tices Act standard to 
political ads.
Political parties, candidates and 
other organizations should not 
“engage in conduct that is mis-
leading or deceptive or is likely 
to mislead or deceive.” 
To ensure that there is truth in 
political advertising.
p. 13
Automatic Enrolment. Automatically add citizens to the 
electoral roll through the Con-
tinuous Roll Update system.
Many young Australians 
believe that, since voting is 
compulsory, they go on to the 
electoral roll automatically once 
they turn eighteen – this would 
be easy to apply and is hap-
pening in NSW and Victoria.
p. 14
House Committee 
for ongoing review of 
democratic reforms.
The committee would need 
to be able to call on indepen-
dent analytic support. It is 
also important that the agency 
charged with support enjoys the 
confidence not just of MPs but 
also of the wider community. 
One possibility would be for the 
Committee to be served by the 
Productivity Commission whose 
staff could be augmented for 
this purpose.
The immediate changes that 
the independents are able to 
win in the lower House are 
important, but the longer term 
vitality of the system, how 
public trust is revitalized and 
strengthened, is paramount. 
To make our government work 
better for us we need an ongo-
ing and sustained review of our 
democracy
p. 14
5
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INTRODUCTION
Saturday’s political earthquake demonstrates Australians do not like the way their political system 
is working. This is a critical message. Community distrust and cynicism are bad for the major 
parties and bad for public policy. Australia faces many big challenges – a three speed economy, 
a second round of the resources boom, skills shortages, infrastructure deficits, climate change, 
refugees, indigenous recognition, to name only a few. But the past election campaign did nothing 
to crystallise choices or to build an informed public opinion on any of these issues.
As has happened in Britain, Canada and New Zealand, a political system that was designed in 
the early twentieth century must now adapt to the very different conditions of the twenty-first 
century. 
The formal political and policy process – covering the workings of parliament, the legislative and 
budget process, and the general effectiveness of parliament as an arena for communicating 
national choices to the wider Australian community – is the single greatest influence on the 
wellbeing of all Australians.  Circumstances create contexts. But the political and policy process 
determines how clearly these choices are understood - and how informed are the community’s 
responses.
Most do not recognise that there is an instructive precedent for the present moment. In the 1901-
1909 period, three groups – Protectionists, Labor and Free Traders – vied for power. The result 
was perhaps the most fertile and creative period of policy development in Australia’s political 
history. In that time, before the emergence of the two party system in 1909, the foundations of 
modern Australia were established. 
That time, along with more recent thinking about fair electoral processes, suggests how both 
policy making and electoral regimes can be re-configured to engage Australians much more 
effectively in politics and policy making. The world that spawned the ‘strong’ two party system – 
an Australian society that broadly split along binary lines – has past. Our Australian community is 
now more differentiated and regionalised, with gender, sexuality, ethnicity, the environment and a 
host of other cross cutting issues now dividing and pluralising public attitudes and aspirations.  
In this context parliamentary and electoral processes need to be progressively re-cast. There is 
an immediate agenda. But, as experience accumulates, broader longer term changes also need 
to be introduced. After all, the political and policy making system is our single most important 
piece of politico-economic infrastructure through it public choices are crystallised and support 
for action is mobilised. The following blueprint will allow its relevance and effectiveness to be 
renewed and our democracy strengthened.
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PART ONE: A TRUE PARLIAMENT OF THE PEOPLE
Strengthen the role of private members. 
Our parliament is the meeting place of 150 representatives of the people, not merely the tool 
of parties, or of governments and oppositions. The role of our representatives needs to be 
strengthened. At the moment parliament is dominated by Ministers and by the parties’ agendas. 
A truly democratic parliament would give individual members more opportunities to promote 
legislative ideas and amendments. 
To achieve this, the parliamentary standing orders should be amended to provide for:
• The parliament to sit sufficient days to allow adequate time for both the government’s 
legislative program and consideration of private member’s legislation, at least 80 days. Fast, 
professional assistance in the drafting of legislation should be equally available to all members 
from the Office of Parliamentary Counsel.
• Access of elected parliamentarians to the capacities of the public service should be 
enhanced. To save resources, this should be limited to analysis of policy proposals generated 
by members seeking to amend draft legislation. Public servants should be available to 
provide:
• analysis of economic and fiscal costs of proposals;
• warnings of unintended consequences;
• warnings of administrative complexities.
These functions do not constitute “advice” in the Westminster sense. Rather, they are protections 
against poorly developed legislation. There is no reason why such a function should be 
incompatible with serving the government of the day – which, in dealing with independents and 
minority parties, will want to protect itself against poorly-devised amendments to bills.
• The establishment of an ‘Agenda Committee’ with a membership reflecting the political make-
up of the Parliament, and with a non-government member as chair, which will determine 
the business program and the allocation of time in such a way that no business is artificially 
blocked. It should also be incumbent on members of the Agenda Committee to prevent the 
misuse of ‘no-confidence motions’ and to manage votes in the house when one member is 
sick or unavailable. 
• The Agenda Committee to recommend free vote debates, that is where party-whips do not 
give a direction to their members.
• The Agenda Committee to schedule ‘take note’ debates where the matter concerns an 
emerging issue or a report (such as Garnaut or Henry) on which the government has yet to 
make a decision. The subsequent vote would be only of a ‘take note’ form and not indicate 
approval or disapproval.
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A	Parliamentary	Budget	and	Economic	Office	(PBEO)
A PBEO would also strengthen the role of private members if it is properly constituted. The former 
Economic Planning Advisory Council (EPAC) provides a model of an agency of appropriate size, 
standing and resources. Whereas EPAC reported to the Executive, the proposed PBEO would 
report to the economic committees of both Houses which, for this oversight purpose only, 
could be constituted as a joint committee. On matters outside the capacities of the PBEO, this 
committee could also be empowered to request Productivity Commission reviews.
Following the EPAC model, the resources and standing of this Office would need to be its equal. 
Treasury and other officers might serve on secondment. It should also have the capacity to recruit 
independent staff and commission independent work. The PBEO should cover such functions as:
• the independent economic costing of legislation not proposed by the Government (i.e. that 
not modelled by the Treasury)
• the independent economic costing of amendments proposed during deliberation on bills, 
given that these amendments are more likely to occur as the parliament spends more time 
debating bills, as the power of independents and minor parties increases. 
• Important emerging issues like the use of funds from a second resources boom or the 
implications of a three track economy or major infrastructure proposals should be within its 
ambit. 
To ensure capability and impact, funding would need to be quarantined from executive reduction. 
An effective and informative Question Time: 
Question Time should play an essential role in the transparency and accountability of our elected 
representatives. For too long it has been about ‘political theatre’ and Dorothy Dixers rather than 
informing the public. We need a Question Time where the focus is on seeking information relevant 
to issues of interest or concern to members.
 
To achieve this the Standing Orders should be amended to require Ministers to answer the 
substance of the question without digression. Current Standing Orders (SO 100, HofR, SO 73) 
give little guidance on how an answer should be given although it gives comprehensive advice on 
how question should or should not be asked.
To achieve a more effective Question Time we must:
• Amend the procedural rules of Parliament to allow for the election of• an independent 
Speaker. Some parliaments, for example the UK, elect a Speaker who by convention acts 
independently. This could not be achieved in Australia where the Speakership has invariably 
been a partisan position. An independent Speaker must be above party politics to achieve this 
goal.
• Amend standing orders to restrict questions to one minute in length and require them to ask 
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for government information, not opinion, comment or make unfounded accusations. Answers 
must be required to be direct, succinct and not switch to attacks on political opponents, and 
be restricted to four minutes. 
• Reserve one question time each sitting week solely for non-government members  
• Allow up to three supplementary questions, including by members other than the original 
questioner. Supplementary answers should be limited to two minutes. 
• Amend standing orders to facilitate debate on replies to questions.
Strengthen the House Committee system
The present committee system is dominated by ministers and the executive. It is a reactive 
system at best – enquiries are typically instigated by ministers and invariably set out to deliver 
results that are congenial to them. The Australian people need effective committees and effective 
committees need more independence. 
For this to happen, parliament must:
• Amend standing orders to empower Committees to initiate, within their designated field, 
their own enquiries.
• Share Committee chairs equally between government and non-government members.
• Remove the present claimed immunity of Ministerial staff from appearances at 
parliamentary committees
• Reconstitute the present committee structure by establishing subject committees that 
would cover the full range of portfolios. Emerging issues such as the Henry Tax Review 
and major legislative initiatives would be referred to the appropriate subject committee.
• Oblige the Executive to respond to committee reports within 30 calendar days.
• Make Committee reports the subject of Take Note debates within 21 parliamentary sitting 
days of receipt of the executive’s response. 
• Expand funding for committee work – resources for the Australian parliament should at 
least match the staffing and resource levels of the UK House of Commons Committees. 
• Deny public interest immunity (“executive privilege”) as a ground for declining to provide 
documents to parliamentary committees, save for the cases approved by the Agenda 
Committee due to another factor such as national security.
Standing orders should model the ACT approach in requiring exposure drafts of all major 
pieces of legislation. These should be available for community and stakeholder comment. More 
transparency and more advance discussion of proposed measures are critical to achieving more 
effective government. 
The House and Senate should (re)adopt the ‘Macklin cut-off rule’, which forces the executive to 
give the Senate and the House advance notice of bills and empowers them to decline to consider 
any bills brought forward without early notice, for example legislation rushed at the end of a 
parliamentary session.
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PART TWO: FAIR, OPEN AND BETTER ELECTIONS
Political Donations
Reforming who donates and how
In March this year the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters of the New South 
Wales Parliament produced a comprehensive set of recommendations for campaign finance 
reform. These recommendations are produced in Appendix I and should be the starting point 
for discussion of political funding reform. The report is also an example of how cross-bench 
cooperation, working within an empowered committee environment, can inspire a new direction 
in public policy.
Building on those recommendations we suggest that:
• Only Australian citizens should be allowed to donate to political parties 
Donating to parties and candidates is a great form of political expression – but it should be about 
that-- expression, not influence. When corporations and other organisations donate large sums to 
political parties it makes the rest of us feel that we can’t trust our elected representatives – they 
know which side their bread is buttered on, and it is not the people’s. 
• Increase transparency requirements
We also need to increase transparency of individual donations to make sure corporate money 
isn’t being funnelled through individual donations instead. This means individual donors who 
give more than a certain threshold (we propose $500) would have to disclose the name of their 
employer to the AEC as a part of their donation requirements. All donations above $500 per year 
should also be listed publicly and immediately (although not their employer publicly) – with the 
information updating continually so that we don’t have to wait until after the election to discover 
who funded whose campaign.
• Cap individual donations at a reasonable limit 
Donating is a legitimate means of political engagement – GetUp couldn’t function without 
its members donating - but there should be reasonable limits. Individual donations should 
be capped at $1,000 a year to prevent anyone having undue influence over our elected 
representatives. This should be adjusted for CPI.
Membership fees of natural persons should not be included within this limit but any associate 
members, such as trade unions, corporations or any other association should be limited at $25 
000 and should be publicly recorded. Such funds should directed toward the administration of 
political parties only, with audits conducted by a properly funded investigative branch of the AEC.
•	 Groups like GetUp should be covered too
Any organization that engages in direct political activity should be covered by similar laws as 
those of the political parties. Donations to such organizations should be capped in the year of 
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an election and be allowed to come from organizations and individuals. While the ‘buying of 
influence’ is not as pertinent a problem, these organizations should be required to publicly list all 
donors over $500 per financial year to gain the greatest transparency possible. 
Options for determining what type of organisation meets this requirement include:
a) an expenditure test (if over $500 is spent per annum in political advertising)
b) a self-identification test (if some tax advantage was also conferred on small donations to  
 encourage groups to identify under this category)
c) those organizations currently required by the AEC to make financial disclosures.
Public Funding
When should the public pay for parties and candidates?
Public	funding	is	necessary	to	keep	the	playing	field	open
Public funding for candidates for political office reduces the risk that successful candidates are 
encumbered by undue influence. It is important to level the playing field so that new and minor 
political players, without significant financial backing can get involved. 
Public funding must be based on a democratic metric
Not everyone should get paid to run in our elections – it’s not viable and it’s not fair. But anyone 
who raises enough public interest and support should be provided with a financial contribution for 
the costs of campaigning. 
Each lower house seat, and Senate seat, should have a set pool of funds for distribution to 
candidates that receive above 4% for the vote. This pool of funds may differ based on an 
independent assessment of the costs of campaigning in a particular division of the House or state 
for the Senate, to be determined by the AEC. Each candidate should receive their proportional 
share after the final declaration of the ballot. 
Candidates should also receive a small premium connected to the amount of small donations that 
they generate. These should not be claimed by parties but only by individual candidates (who 
may be members of parties). Candidates should receive ‘top up’ public funding with reference 
to the number of donations they receive. This would encourage candidates to engage the public 
and to build local movements rather than simply rely on the public purse alone to raise money. As 
parties grow, such funding could be slowly removed so as to help ween political parties off their 
addiction to private donations. 
Parties should not, however, be allowed to transfer public funding accrued through the contest 
of one seat to another candidate in another area. To prevent this happening intra-party transfers 
of funds between campaign accounts should be considered ‘donations’ (and the only exception 
to the rule that only natural persons can donate.) This would mean that the A Party could only 
transfer $1000 to their candidate in the seat of Z each financial year. Provisions would also need 
to be made to allow some transfer of election funding to the general administrative costs of 
parties.
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Public	funding	must	be	transparent	and	not	a	trapping	of	office
Government Advertising must not be used for party purposes.
Principles relating to the use of government funds for public advertising must be codified and 
legislated, to stop incumbent party advantage. Such principles include that public advertising 
campaigns on behalf of government must:
• Be directly relevant to Government responsibilities and functions;
• Only occur after government policy has been legislated for by parliament
• Provide objective, factual and explanatory information, free from partisan promotion of 
government policy
• If their budget is in excess of $250,000, be examined by an independent Campaign 
Advertising Reviewer for a compliance review. The appointment of the Reviewer must be 
supported by at least two thirds of the members of the House of Representatives.
• The advertising budget of the Government must be capped for each year and not be 
allowed to fluctuate beyond a particular range from year to year, to prevent pre-election 
spending sprees.
Electorate Allowances should not be used to the advantage of incumbents
All material distributed by members of parliament should be subject to scrutiny by an appointed 
officer of the Parliament such as the Auditor General or an Integrity Commissioner to ensure they 
meet the standards that apply to government advertising as a whole (listed above). 
From the day the writs are issued, members of parliament should have no access to printing 
allowances or any other entitlements (such as postage, travel, and telephones) that provide them 
with an organizational advantage over another candidate for office.
Campaigns and campaign ads should be about the truth
Currently Commonwealth electoral law provides that it is an offence to do ‘any matter or thing 
that is likely to mislead or deceive an elector in relation to the casting of a vote.’ This provision is 
not specific enough and has thus not been a significant enough protection of truth in our political 
debates. The South Australian legislation, which is the strongest current model, still provides for 
the material needing to be ‘inaccurate and misleading’. 
Instead the rule used in the Trade Practices Act, that applies to corporations in their advertising 
and conduct, should equally be used in politics. That is political parties, candidates and other 
organizations should not “engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead 
or deceive.” The AEC should be supported to perform a similar function in monitoring such 
advertisements as it does in controlling all other unauthorised election material. 
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PART THREE – LOOKING TO THE LONG-TERM
The above proposals represent steps connected to parliamentary reform and campaign finance 
reform – but we need broader change if we want to bring Australian democracy into the 21st 
Century.
Fixing our franchise so everyone can vote
Currently, the AEC relies on newly eligible voters initiating action to join the electoral roll. Many 
young Australians believe that, since voting is compulsory, they go on to the electoral roll 
automatically once they turn eighteen – this is not the case - but it should be.
The AEC partially automates maintenance of the Electoral Roll by practicing a “Continuous Roll 
Update” (CRU) system. This integrates information from various Commonwealth, State and 
Territory databases. It then carries out “habitation checks” at addresses for which it believes it 
may have incorrect voter information. This practice makes the AEC more efficient at removing 
voters from the roll than adding voters to it. The current system is clearly the wrong way around. 
We need to make sure our democracy is focused on making sure everyone can have their say.
Automatic or direct enrolment is an idea whose time has come. It is already being implemented in 
New South Wales and Victoria. It has been extensively canvassed in the Electoral Reform Green 
Paper, and it is simple, easy to do, and will be incredibly effective at giving more Australians their 
birthright – that of a vote for our representatives.
The Effectiveness and Productivity of Parliament is Everybody’s Business
To make our government work better for us we need an ongoing and sustained review of 
our democracy. A joint house Committee with a mandate to review the effectiveness of the 
democratic system and strengthen Australia’s Federal parliamentary institutions (including COAG 
arrangements) is imperative.
This Committee could be constituted from equal numbers of Government, Opposition and 
independent/minor party members drawn from both Houses, chaired by an Independent MHR 
or minor party member or Senator. It could be empowered to co-opt independent specialist 
members on an ad hoc basis.
The committee would need to be able to call on independent analytic support. It is also important 
that the agency charged with support enjoys the confidence not just of MPs but also of the 
wider community. One possibility would be for the Committee to be served by the Productivity 
Commission whose staff could be augmented for this purpose. The Commission would also draw 
on the views of the public and on the expertise on parliamentary processes that is available in the 
wider community. Another possibility would be to establish a staff constituted as a Democratic 
Commission to serve the committee. Whichever approach is adopted, adequate funds and 
resources should be available for its critical work.
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This step is essential to learn from the experience of the immediate suite for reforms proposed for 
the business of the House of Representatives and to ensure informed debate about the broader 
workings of the wider political and policy making system whose effectiveness is critical for the 
wellbeing of all Australians.
The same committee should also review the AEC’s conduct of the 2010 elections, complementary 
to the AEC’s (presumed) review. 
The resolution establishing the Committee should: 
provide terms of reference requiring it to:  
• review the conduct of the 2010 elections and recommend reforms to the enrolment by all 
eligible citizens, participation in the electoral system including rates of voting by enrolled 
voters and informal voting and any other relevant matter, particularly measures related to 
Senate voting;
• investigate and recommend reforms to enhance the responsiveness of the democratic 
system to the wishes of the citizens and strengthen the democratic institutions and 
processes of the Commonwealth of Australia including but not limited to 
• further reforms to the funding of and expenditure on campaigning by candidates, political 
parties and third parties
• reforms to the regulation of lobbying activity
• codes of conduct and/or codes of ethics for parliamentarians and members of the 
executive (e.g. ministers and parliamentary secretaries) and recommendations to the media
• the effectiveness of wider policy making and legislative processes from the perspective of 
reconciling public engagement and discussion with acceptable and actionable outcomes.
• the role of the Senate. Perhaps the most significant potential change to the whole 
governmental process would be to cease appointing ministers from the Senate and turn 
this Chamber into a wholly committee House.
• consider whether a transition to multi-member electorates would be more democratic and 
if so how that transition could occur.
and require
• the committee to provide for public participation to the maximum practical extent in each 
element of its inquiries;
• it to conduct public hearings in the capital city of every State and Territory and non-
metropolitan locations in every State and the Northern Territory
• it to submit its final report not later than 21 August 2012; and 
• that the final report include draft legislation (bills) for any recommended legislative reform
• that concurrent debate in the House of Representatives on that Report and bill take 
precedence over all other business on the first sitting day 30 calendar days after it is 
submitted.
A properly focussed parliamentary committee, with the support of the Productivity Commission, 
will be able to lay out a blue-print for a reform of our democracy to make a parliament of the 
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people, campaigns that are open and fair and a nation governed by bright ideas. 
CONCLUSION: TAKING AUSTRALIA’S DEMOCRACY INTO THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
The ideas in this paper are designed to be implemented on a timeline of 1-3 years. But we 
need a process to lock in reforms for the long term and to keep working on further reforms. A 
new approach to the development of public policy, particularly to the way it intersects with the 
public debate, needs to be instituted. A new approach that is congruent with the formation of an 
informed public is an imperative. Public opinion develops serially, like a snowball, and political 
processes need to reflect this fact. Present legislative and policy making processes are residues 
from the strong two party era, which is coming to a close. They are unchanged in essentials since 
1909.
The immediate changes that the independents are able to win in the lower House are important, 
but the longer term vitality of the system, how public trust is revitalized and strengthened, 
is paramount. Agenda setting, legislative, policy making and budgetary processes, need to 
be subject to continuing review and scrutiny. This will invoivle such matters as the role of 
committees, their resources, the legislature vis-à-vis the executive, inter-House relations and the 
role of the Senate. 
The need for further and continuing review reflects the fundamental importance of the 
parliamentary political and policy making process. Since this is how Australians learn about 
national challenges and policy choices, this is single the most critical piece of national 
infrastructure - it is the most critical component of our whole politico-economic system. This 
report brings together the key ideas to lay out a blueprint for how we can bring this critical piece 
of national infrastructure into the 21st Century.
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1 Adapted from: New South Wales. Parliament. Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters
Public funding of election campaigns [report] / Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Parliament
NSW. [Sydney, NSW] : The Committee, 2010. 396 p. ; 30cm. (Report ; no.2/54). Available from http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parl-
ment/committee.nsf/0/82f12c9fc8e2dbdcca2576f200213db6/$FILE/report%202-54.pdf
APPENDIX I. NSW PARLIAMENT REPORT ON PUBLIC FUNDING OF 
ELECTION CAMPAIGNS - RECOMMENDATIONS1 
RECOMMENDATION 1: While a national approach to electoral and political finance reform 
is preferred, the Committee recommends that the Premier introduce legislation to reform the 
electoral and political finance regime in New South Wales independent of action by the federal 
government, prior to the State elections 2011 
RECOMMENDATION 2: The Committee recommends that the Joint Standing Committee on 
Electoral Matters consider the operation of the reforms as part of its review of the State Elections 
2011.  
RECOMMENDATION 3: The Committee recommends that the Premier include the principles 
outlined by the Electoral Commissioner in the object clause of legislation to reform the electoral 
and political finance regime. 
RECOMMENDATION 4: The Committee recommends that the Premier incorporate in legislation 
to reform the electoral and political finance regime a cap on all donations from individuals, set at 
$2,000 per political party, group or independent candidate per financial year, and all caps to be 
adjusted according to the CPI. 
This cap should be subject to review by the Election Funding Authority after each New South 
Wales state election. 
RECOMMENDATION 5: The Committee recommends that the Premier include in legislation to 
reform the electoral and political finance regime that political donations from individuals be limited 
to those individuals on the New South Wales electoral roll and/or the Australian electoral roll.
RECOMMENDATION 6: The Committee recommends that the Premier incorporate in legislation to 
reform the electoral and political finance regime a cap on all donations from entities, set at $2,000 
per political party, group or independent candidate per financial year, and all caps to be adjusted 
according to the CPI. 
This cap should be subject to review by the Election Funding Authority after each New South 
Wales state election, subject to guidelines published by the Premier. 
RECOMMENDATION 7: The Committee recommends that the Premier include in legislation to 
reform the electoral and political finance regime a requirement that those entities that are entitled 
to donate to a political party registered in New South Wales be limited to: 
(a) a company with an Australian Business Number; 
(b) a registered trade union; and 
(c) an incorporated association which carries out the majority of its activities in New South Wales. 
The Committee further recommends that the Premier require that an individual representative be 
nominated for each donation by an entity. 
RECOMMENDATION 8: Given that the reforms to political donations recommended by the 
Committee address concerns about donations from developers, the Committee recommends that 
the Premier include in legislation to reform the electoral and political finance regime, the repeal of 
those provisions relating to a ban on developer donations. 
RECOMMENDATION 9: The Committee recommends that the Premier include in legislation to 
reform the electoral and political finance regime a requirement for registered political parties and 
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groups to: 
(a) maintain separate funds for state campaigns, federal campaigns and administrative funds; and 
(b) submit annual audited accounts of the separate funds to the Election Funding Authority.
RECOMMENDATION 10: The Committee recommends that the Premier include in legislation to 
reform the electoral and political finance regime: 
(a) an exemption for party membership fees and party compulsory levies on parliamentarians, 
from the cap on political donations, and 
(b) a cap on party membership fees, set at $2,000 per member, per financial year. 
RECOMMENDATION 11: The Committee recommends that in preparing legislation to reform 
the electoral and political finance regime, the Premier ensure that where registered political 
parties receive affiliation fees, those fees only be used for administrative purposes (as with party 
membership fees) and not be used to calculate a reduction of that party’s Administration Fund 
allocation.        
RECOMMENDATION 12: The Committee recommends that the Premier include in legislation to 
reform the electoral and political finance regime that intra-party transfers of funds to political 
parties, candidates and groups in New South Wales are classified as political donations, except 
where deposited in the Federal Campaign Account. 
RECOMMENDATION 13: The Committee recommends that in preparing legislation to reform the 
electoral and political finance regime that the Premier give further consideration to the regulation 
of funds generated by ‘held assets’. 
Registered parties and their associated entities are prohibited from using any income from held 
funds or assets for electoral expenditure. 
RECOMMENDATION 14: The Committee recommends that the Premier include in legislation to 
reform the electoral and political finance regime provisions to: 
(a) allow candidates to contribute to their own campaigns consistent with any expenditure cap 
that is adopted 
(b) require candidates to certify that they have not directly or indirectly received a gift which has 
enabled them to self-fund, or outline the nature and source of any gift that has enabled them to 
self-fund. 
RECOMMENDATION 15: The Committee recommends that the Premier include in legislation to 
reform the electoral and political finance regime an exemption for bequests to political parties and 
candidates from the cap on donations. 
RECOMMENDATION 16: The Committee recommends that the Premier include in legislation to 
reform the electoral and political finance regime provisions to: 
(a) retain the requirement that loans over $1,000 from sources other than a financial institution or 
credit card transaction be recorded with the Election Funding Authority 
(b) include any uncharged interest on such loans as a donation, subject to the caps of $2,000 per 
political party, group or independent candidate per financial year. 
RECOMMENDATION 17: The Committee recommends that the Premier ensure that the existing 
reportable disclosure threshold amount of $1,000 per donor, per financial year be retained in 
legislation to reform the electoral and political finance regime. . 
RECOMMENDATION 18: The Committee recommends that the Premier include in legislation to 
reform the electoral and political finance regime provisions to: 
(a) set the reporting period for disclosure of donations at 12 months, the same as the disclosure 
period. 
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(b) align disclosure audits for donations to state campaigns with the Australian Electoral 
Commission’s system for disclosures.  
RECOMMENDATION 19: The Committee recommends that as part of comprehensive reform 
of the political finance system, the Premier introduce caps on expenditure for political parties, 
candidates and groups contesting state elections, to: 
(a) create separate expenditure caps for general campaign expenditure, Legislative Assembly 
campaign expenditure and Legislative Council campaign expenditure. 
(b) establish a cap for general campaign expenditure based on the number of seats contested. 
(c) set identical caps for endorsed and unendorsed candidates to the Legislative Assembly. 
(d) set consistent caps across all 93 seats for the Legislative Assembly. 
(e) link the cap for Legislative Council expenditure to any cap on third party expenditure. 
(f) resolve potential loopholes before caps are put in place. 
(g) link expenditure caps to inflation. 
(h) consider whether any proposed expenditure caps discriminate against independent 
candidates or new entrants          
RECOMMENDATION 20: The Committee recommends that in developing legislation to reform 
the electoral and political finance regime, the Premier consider capping expenditure by political 
parties, candidates and groups from the beginning of the financial year in which the election is 
held. 
FINDING 1: That in developing legislation for appropriate expenditure caps, the Premier consider 
factors including: 
(a)  The impact of the definition on other aspects of the political finance scheme, such as: 
 eligibility for reimbursement of campaign expenditure through public funding 
 which third party activities are captured under any cap on expenditure and 
 the review systems for government advertising 
(b)  That the extent to which administrative and operational activities are included in the defi 
 nition may affect the amount of public funding apportioned between campaign expenses  
 and administrative and operational funds. 
(c)  The need to capture all relevant campaigning activities such as telecommunication costs,  
 to prevent circumvention of expenditure caps. 
(d)  Definitions of ‘electoral expenditure’ and including in other jurisdictions.
RECOMMENDATION 21: The Committee recommends that the Premier, in introducing legislation 
to reform the electoral and political finance regime, ensure that if expenditure caps are placed 
on political parties and candidates, then advertising and communication by third parties is also 
regulated. 
RECOMMENDATION 22: The Committee recommends that the Premier consult with a wide range 
of third party groups before introducing legislation to impose limits on third party advertising and 
communication. 
FINDING 2: That in introducing any legislation regulating third parties, the Premier should give 
consideration to: 
(a) requiring all third parties to register with the Election Funding Authority 
(b) requiring third parties to be subject to the same auditing and disclosure requirements as 
political parties 
(c) adopting an expenditure cap that is significantly lower than that for political parties. 
(d) adopting both a state-wide expenditure cap and a maximum amount that can be spent in 
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each district 
(e) synchronising the timing of third party expenditure caps with the timing of expenditure caps 
for political parties 
(f) preventing third parties from accepting donations from political parties and candidates 
RECOMMENDATION 23: The Committee recommends that the Presiding Officers of the NSW 
Parliament ensure that claims by Members for reimbursement in relation to the Electoral 
Mailout Account, which are made during the regulated period prior to an election, are subject to 
independent scrutiny and an approval process undertaken and managed by the Parliamentary 
administration. 
RECOMMENDATION 24: The Committee recommends that the Premier present legislation 
making provision for the pre-review of government advertising by an appropriate independent 
body to: 
(a) ensure there is no ‘partisan’ or ‘party political’ content, for the regulated election period. 
(b) the composition of the independent body should be a matter for consultation during the draft 
exposure phase of the legislation for the new scheme. 
(c) include a workable definition of ‘partisan’ and ‘party political’ content to be used to regulate 
government advertising in the election period. The Committee notes that the definition should 
be consistent with the relevant principles contained in the current Department of Premier and 
Cabinet guidelines and bear in mind the existing definitions of ‘electoral matter’ and ‘electoral 
material’ within the Parliamentary Electorates and Elections Act. 
(d) require government departments and agencies, in the regulated period, to submit 
advertisements to the independent body for assessment against the definition and guidelines, 
prior to the commencement of the ‘peer review’ approval process that will continue to govern all 
types of government advertising. 
(e) provide for a seven day turnaround time for completion of the pre-approval assessment and 
for automatic approval of government advertisements in cases where the process is not finalised 
within the seven days. 
(f) require that government advertisements during the regulated election period be identified as 
having been the subject of the pre-approval process. 
RECOMMENDATION 25: The Committee recommends that: 
(a) the independent body not be involved in the ‘peer review’ approval process that follows the 
pre-approval assessment in the regulated election period; 
(b) certain categories of government advertising, for example, job notices, notifications, public 
health and natural disaster announcements, are not to be subject to the pre-approval assessment 
process undertaken by the independent body.  
RECOMMENDATION 26: The Committee further recommends that the Premier consider the 
options for action to be taken by the independent body where government advertising is in 
breach of the definition of ‘partisan’ and ‘party political’ content contained in the Act and is not in 
keeping with the relevant guidelines. Possible options for amendments may include: 
(a) the independent body reporting immediately to Parliament on the particular instance, including 
details of the advertisement and its cost; 
(b) providing that it is a breach of the Act and an offence for a government department or 
agency to proceed with an advertisement where the independent body has determined that the 
advertisement is ‘partisan’ and ‘party political’ and that such a contravention of the Act should be 
subject to a penalty. 
RECOMMENDATION 27: The Committee recommends that: 
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(a) the Auditor General conduct more regular reviews of government advertising outside of the 
regulated election period. 
(b) the Premier report to Parliament in response to any recommendations arising from the Auditor 
General’s reviews of government advertising. 
RECOMMENDATION 28: The Committee recommends that the Premier include in legislation 
to reform the electoral and political finance regime an increase in the amount of public funding 
available to political parties, groups and candidates, in order to partly compensate for loss of 
income from donations. 
RECOMMENDATION 29: The Committee recommends that the Premier include in legislation to 
reform the electoral and political finance regime a retention of the current eligibility threshold to 
receive public funding of 4% of primary votes, or a member elected. 
FINDING 3: In legislating to reform public funding, the Premier should give consideration to: 
(a) The strong arguments against a system premised on full public funding of election campaigns. 
(b) The need to consider public funding in relation to any expenditure caps. 
(c) The bicameral structure of the New South Wales Parliament, including that some parties 
contest both houses of Parliament, while others contest only one house. 
(d) The current method of calculating public funding by reference to an amount per elector, 
apportioned according to first preference votes. 
(e) Ensuring a fair and level playing field. 
(f) Whether increased capacity for advanced payments is required.
RECOMMENDATION 30: The Committee recommends that the Premier include in legislation 
to reform the electoral and political finance regime provisions that any public funding model be 
based on reimbursement of electoral expenditure, rather than entitlement. 
RECOMMENDATION 31: The Committee recommends that the Premier include in legislation to 
reform the electoral and political finance regime that the party or official agent be the recipient of 
public funding. 
RECOMMENDATION 32: The Committee recommends that the Premier include in legislation 
to reform the electoral and political finance regime, provision be made for public funding of the 
operational and administrative costs of political parties with elected members and that the level of 
funding be determined according to a tiered model on the basis of Parliamentary representation. 
RECOMMENDATION 33: The Committee recommends that the Premier consider including in 
legislation to reform the electoral and political finance regime provision for a ‘policy development 
fund’ to help those parties ineligible for operational and administrative funding. 
RECOMMENDATION 34: The Committee recommends that, as a matter of priority, the Premier 
give consideration to bringing forward legislation as follows, in consultation with the Electoral 
Commissioner, to: 
(a) amend those provisions in the Election Funding and Disclosures Act 1981 identified by the 
Election Funding Authority to be in need of clarification as a result of the amendments arising in 
the Election Funding Amendment (Political Donations and Expenditure) Act 2008, particularly in 
respect of definitional matters and the period for which obligations arising under the Act apply 
and expire. (The amendments are contained within Appendix 4 to the report); and 
(b) amend s.96I of the Election Funding and Disclosures Act 1981 to remove the requirement 
to establish ‘actual knowledge’ of an offence at the time it is committed, in order to facilitate 
prosecution of offences captured by this general offence provision. 
The Committee further recommends that any amendment to s.96I should make express provision 
for the availability of a defence of ‘reasonable mistake’, or any other relevant defence, for 
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offences covered by this section.
RECOMMENDATION 35: The Committee recommends that the Premier clarify with the Electoral 
Commissioner the necessity for amendments to the Election Funding and Disclosures Act 1981 in 
order to: 
(a) ensure audit certificates are provided in accordance with the requirements of the Act; and 
(b) provide for possible exemptions from the requirements, where considered necessary by 
the EFA, including where the cost to a small party, individual candidate or third party may be 
unreasonable. 
RECOMMENDATION 36: The Committee recommends that: 
(a) the Premier consult with the Electoral Commissioner on the adequacy of the existing audit 
and inspection powers conferred on the Election Funding Authority to enable it to perform its 
functions under the Election Funding and Disclosures Act 1981; and 
(b) the Electoral Commissioner inform the Committee of the outcome of consultations with the 
Department of Premier and Cabinet to remedy any particular problems in relation to the extent 
and exercise of the EFA’s powers under the Act as stands. 
RECOMMENDATION 37: The Committee recommends that: 
(a) the Premier consider including in legislation to reform the electoral and political finance a 
tiered penalty scheme for certain breaches of the requirements of the proposed new scheme, 
along the lines suggested by the Electoral Commissioner; and 
(b) as part of the consultation process around the legislation for the new scheme, the Premier 
consult stakeholders on the specific amounts that should apply to the tiered monetary penalties
RECOMMENDATION 38: The Committee recommends that the Premier consider including in 
legislation to reform the electoral and political finance regime provisions so that a registered 
political party that fails to comply with the requirements of the proposed new scheme, be 
ineligible for public funding. The Committee notes that there will be an avenue through the courts 
to prosecute offences for non-compliance. 
RECOMMENDATION 39: The Committee recommends that the Premier include in legislation to 
reform the electoral and political finance regime a requirement that parties, groups and individual 
candidates receiving public funding under the new scheme to furnish the Election Funding 
Authority with properly audited accounts of their financial dealings for review. 
RECOMMENDATION 40: The Committee recommends that, where there are reasonable grounds 
for the Election Funding Authority to believe breaches and offences have occurred under a new 
scheme, the Election Funding Authority be empowered to: 
(a) compel the production of books, records and other information from any person or 
organisation; 
(b) question any person in relation to possible breaches under the Act; 
(c) engage the services of any person for the purpose of getting expert assistance, 
for the purpose of performing its functions
RECOMMENDATION 41: The Committee recommends that the Premier ensure the Election 
Funding Authority receives additional funds and resources to support the enhanced compliance 
and investigative role the Committee has recommended for the Authority.  
RECOMMENDATION 42: The Committee recommends that the Premier consider amending the 
Parliamentary Electorates and Elections Act 1912 to include non-compliance with the legislative 
requirements under the new scheme, where this has affected the election result, as a specific 
ground for disputing that result through the Court of Disputed Returns.
RECOMMENDATION 43: The Committee recommends that: 
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(a) the Election Funding Authority undertake educational initiatives targeting parties, candidates, 
third parties and the voting public about their responsibilities and obligations under the 
legislation; and 
(b) the Authority be adequately resourced to do so
RECOMMENDATION 44: The Committee recommends that the issues of compliance with the 
scheme, proposed offences and penalties, and the enforcement system be included by the 
Premier as areas requiring specific attention in the consultations with relevant stakeholders on 
any draft legislation arising from the recommendations contained in this report, in particular: 
(a) the extent of the investigatory powers to be conferred on the Election Funding Authority; 
(b) the guidelines and criteria to apply in the exercise of the new investigatory powers, particularly 
in relation to areas of discretion. 
RECOMMENDATION 45: The Committee recommends that in the drafting of any legislation 
brought forward to give effect to a new scheme for the regulation of electoral expenditure and 
political party funding, consistent with the recommendations contained in this report, the Premier 
consult closely with the Electoral Commissioner and the Election Funding Authority in formulating 
proposed amendments.
FINDING 4: The Committee finds that, while the enforcement system recommended as part of 
the new scheme for public funding of election campaigns is an important feature of the integrated 
package of reforms that comprise the scheme, particularly in terms of its deterrent value, the 
ultimate success of the scheme will turn on the extent to which the reforms achieve cultural 
change. 
The Committee’s goal in proposing the amendments contained in these recommendations is 
to improve the level of compliance under the existing legislation and the capacity to prosecute 
offences under the legislation as it stands, as well as making provision for an appropriate system 
of enforcement on the introduction of a new public funding scheme for election campaigns. 
The Committee further finds that the extent to which implementation of a new enforcement 
system assists in achieving these goals is also dependent upon policy and other educational 
initiatives targeting parties, candidates, and the voting public about their responsibilities and 
obligations under the legislation.  
RECOMMENDATION 46: The Committee recommends that the EFA report publicly on the use of 
its proposed powers by including statistical information and cases in its annual reports. 
RECOMMENDATION 47: The Committee recommends that the referral from the Premier to 
the Committee of the inquiry into the State election 2011 encompass as a specific area for 
examination the operation of the enforcement system and the use of the EFA’s investigatory 
powers, as implemented in the new public funding scheme.  
RECOMMENDATION 48: The Committee recommends that the Premier implement the 
Committee’s public funding model through new legislation and the Election Funding and 
Disclosures Act 1981 be repealed.  
RECOMMENDATION 49: The Committee recommends that the public funding legislation be 
drafted to reflect the principles and objects recommended by the Committee, with an exposure 
draft of the bill being released for public consultation and comment.  
RECOMMENDATION 50: That the Premier include in legislation to reform the electoral and 
political finance regime an amendment to the composition of the Election Funding Authority to 
include a retired Supreme Court judge as Chairperson, the Electoral Commissioner and another 
independent office holder. 
RECOMMENDATION 51: The Committee recommends that public funding for local government 
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elections be considered as a separate Committee inquiry process. 
That the issue of public funding for local government be re-visited after the new public funding 
system has been introduced and tested at the state level. 
APPENDIX II - 11 August 1992, Victorian House of Assembly, 
GUIDELINES ON THE CONDUCT OF QUESTION TIME 
It is important that question time is conducted in a manner which both ensures that it fulfils its 
intended purpose and is consistent with the status and proper dignity of Parliament. 
The following are the guidelines based on Standing Orders, Speakers’ rulings and May2 which 
apply to the conduct of question time: 
• a member or a Minister must not read a question or an answer. Such questions and answers 
may be ruled out of order by the Chair; 
• questions and answers must relate to government administration or policy and should be 
directed to the Minister most directly responsible or answering on behalf of such Minister in 
another place; 
• questions to the Premier may relate to matters within the Premier’s portfolio responsibilities 
and to general matters of government policy and administration, but questions concerning 
detail affecting another portfolio should be directed to the responsible Minister; 
• questions should not seek an expression of opinion, seek a legal opinion or ask whether 
statements reported in the media are accurate or correct; 
• questions should not seek a solution to a hypothetical proposition, be trivial, vague or 
meaningless; 
• questions should not contain epithets or rhetorical, controversial, ironical, unbecoming or 
offensive expressions, or expressions of opinion, argument, inferences or imputations; 
• questions should not raise matters which are sub judice or anticipate debate on an Order of 
the Day; 
• where a question relates to an allegation, assertion, claim, imputation or similar matter, the 
member is responsible for the accuracy of the facts. Where the facts are of sufficient moment 
the member may be required to provide prima facie proof to the Speaker before the question 
is admitted; 
• questions cannot reflect on the character or conduct of members of either House and certain 
other persons in official or public positions which are defined in May. Attention is also drawn 
to the provisions of the Australian House of Representatives Standing Orders which restrict 
questions critical of the character or conduct of other persons to questions on notice; 
• where a question seeks information which is too lengthy to be dealt with in an answer to a 
question or otherwise invites a Ministerial statement, the Chair may disallow it and suggest 
that the Minister to whom it is directed consider making a Ministerial statement on the matter 
following question time. It should be noted that such action is not constrained by the practice 
of issuing copies of Ministerial statements, which is a courtesy only, or by the relatively recent 
practice of Ministerial statements being followed by debate on the question that the Ministerial 
statement be noted ; 
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2 C. J. Boulton (Ed.), Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament . London: Butterworths.
• questions which breach the guidelines are out of order and there is no right to immediately 
rephrase or re-ask questions which have been disallowed; 
• answers must comply with the same rules and practices as apply to the asking of questions; 
• answers must be directly responsive, relevant, succinct, limited to the subject matter of the 
question, may provide statements of policy or the intentions of the government, including 
information on examinations of policy options and other actions which the Minister has had 
undertaken but must not debate the matter. (Answers to questions should be limited to 2 
minutes usually and an absolute maximum of 5 minutes actual speaking time); 
• an answer may be refused on the grounds of public policy, for example, that answering may 
jeopardise criminal investigations or for some other particular reason may be against the 
public interest 
• that the information is not available to the Minister, in which case it may be requested that it 
be placed on notice 
• that the Minister intends to make a Ministerial statement on the subject matter in the near 
future.
 
The conduct and effectiveness of question time is in the hands of members. It will assist if: 
• personal conversation is limited as it is discourteous and adds to the background sound 
which creates difficulty in clearly hearing questions and answers; 
• a member or a Minister speaking pauses whenever audible conversation, interjection or other 
disorderly behaviour occurs; 
• a member or a Minister who is unable to control his/her disorderly conduct leaves the 
Chamber for the remainder of question time rather than risk being named. The Chair may 
exercise its absolute discretion concerning the call by not giving the call to a member or a 
Minister whose conduct has been disorderly, including interjections. 
A member or Minister who has been consistently warned as a result of disorderly conduct in 
question time may be named without further warning as a result of further disorderly conduct 
during any part of proceedings on that day or a future day during the current sittings period. 
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Appendix III – From: I Marsh and D Yencken, Into the Future: The Neglect of the 
Long Term in Australian Politics (Melbourne: Black Inc. 2004) and ultimately based on 
Chapter 10, ‘Governments and Parliament’, in I. Marsh, Beyond the Two Party System: Political 
Representation, Economic Competitiveness and Australian Politics, Cambridge University 
Press, Melbourne, 1995 The Period 1901 to 1909 as an Example of the Possibilities for 
Developing Parliament’s Role
The first decade after Federation could be considered the most creative in Australian political 
development. It has many lessons for us today and on that account warrants this brief 
digression.3
 In the period from 1901 to 1909, the longer-term political strategy that guided Australia’s 
subsequent socio-economic development was determined. The policy frameworks then 
established, which have since been described as ‘the Australian settlement’, lasted broadly 
until 1983. They introduced that distinctive pattern of fairness, which has hitherto characterised 
social relations in Australia. Frank Castles, a distinguished analyst of welfare states, has 
described this as Australia’s ‘wage earner welfare state’.4 This reflected the ideology of social 
liberalism that was potent in the late nineteenth century and continues as an important element in 
Australia’s political tradition. The ‘wage earner welfare state’ was also consistent with Australia’s 
international trading environment, a condition that lasted from the early years of the twentieth 
century until roughly the 1960s. It was based on manufacturing jobs for male breadwinners with 
wages determined not only by what markets would pay, but also by what was judged necessary 
for a family to live a decent life. From the late 1960s, international economic developments and 
changing domestic social norms made this strategy increasingly dysfunctional but it served 
Australia  well for many years. 
 The policy decisions that composed ‘the Australian settlement’ emerged from a divided 
political environment. Between 1901 and 1909, three parties, Protectionists, Free Traders and 
Labor, competed for public support. No party won an outright parliamentary majority. Election 
results a variety of not immediately compatible aspirations, attitudes and purposes. Without a 
majority party in parliament, governments were created and unmade according to their ability 
to gather majority support for themselves and their measures in parliament. They were also 
required to obtain majorities in two chambers. This brought into focus the political mechanisms 
available for building backbench and inter-house support both for governments and for individual 
measures. 
 Governments were created either by explicit formal agreement between the parties or 
by tacit informal support with individual negotiations on particular measures. This left a band 
of unresolved issues. These, what might be termed ‘strategic’ issues, involved matters that 
entered the political agenda championed by one or more parties. But other parties needed to 
be convinced of their desirability. To manage these issues structures were needed to allow their 
investigation and resolution independently of the life of governments, the routines of a single 
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House and the electoral cycle.
 The resolution of these contested, strategic issues required an independent exercise in 
political inquiry and political persuasion. By such means, the political ground could be prepared.
 ‘Support in return for concessions’ was one means by which majorities were created, and the 
redefinition of an issue in more encompassing terms was another. In addition, interests beyond 
parliament had to be persuaded of the link between their concerns and those of other seemingly 
disparate interests. ‘New Protection’ was a classic example of such a manoeuvre. Manufacturers 
and trade unions initially seemed to be totally opposed. But Alfred Deakin, the primary author 
of the Australian settlement, linked protection for manufactures to the establishment of the 
arbitration system. Norms of justice and fairness were to be sought in a new context. Thus he 
created a win for both groups and ultimately for the whole Australian community. By such means, 
contingent majority coalitions were created to support particular measures. 
 In this more fluid political context, independent investigation of strategic issues was 
required. This offers perhaps the most vivid contrast between the pattern of policy making in 
the two-party period, and that in the more plural political world that preceded it. In the two-party 
period, the primary task of strategic political inquiry has been intellectual ‘expert’ investigation of 
a complex new issue to recommend what should be done. Examples are the Campbell Report 
on financial deregulation, or the previously mentioned McClure Report on the welfare system and 
the Hogan Report on nursing home financing. The government, which established these inquiries, 
assumed its prior electoral victory gave it sufficient authority to implement the findings, should 
it agree with them. The failure even to discuss in public the recommendations of the last of the 
cited inquiries points to problems raised in these pages. 
 The situation was different in the more pluralist world of 1901 to 1909. The diversity of the 
Australian community was then mirrored in the existence of three parties. Contested strategic 
issues were introduced to parliament before the parties had announced their firm policy stances. 
This allowed a process of intellectual analysis, political and public exchange and learning. It also 
involved the mobilisation of sufficient political authority to permit their resolution. Indeed, these 
two tasks overlapped. The outcome might involve dropping the issue or the identification of a 
positive solution. Parliamentary inquiries represented the key step in this process.
 Over this nine-year period, seventeen select committees and royal commissions were 
established. MPs dominated most of these inquiries. Fourteen of the seventeen inquiries began 
as parliamentary select committees and were later converted to royal commissions. This was 
because the life of a select committee was limited to the parliamentary session in which it was 
established. 
 Of the fourteen parliamentary inquiries, eleven offer the remarkable spectacle of 
MPs engaged on major strategic investigations that went to the heart of policy making and 
administration. So far as strategic policy making is concerned, we see inquiries occurring at 
key stages from the point that an issue emerged on the political agenda to the determination of 
legislation. Seven of the eleven inquiries concerned issues at the frontier of the political agenda: 
the tariff, the desirability of nationalisation of the tobacco cartel, the need for Australian control 
of shipping services, federal old age pensions, access to press cable services, Papua, and the 
future of ‘New Protection’ following the High Court rejection of the arrangement proposed in 
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1907.
 By far the most significant inquiry in scale, duration and impact was that into the tariff. This 
was first suggested by the radical Protectionist, Isaacs, in October 1904 and was established by 
the Free Trade prime minister George Reid in December 1904. The group of eight MPs consisted 
of three Free Traders, three Protectionists and two Labor members, with two representatives 
each from New South Wales and Victoria and one from each other state. The inquiry commenced 
in 1905 and concluded in the middle of 1907. At the outset, it surveyed virtually all significant 
Australian manufacturers and importers to identify tariff anomalies, local capacity, cost obstacles, 
special factors and so forth. This covered 2801 establishments. Evidence was gathered over 
the two years 1905 and 1906. The inquiry held sittings in all capital cities and major provincial 
centres. In total 211 sittings were held and 618 witnesses examined. Over 3000 pages of oral 
evidence were printed. The oral and written evidence offers a unique and comprehensive account 
of Australian industrial capacity and of the barriers and vicissitudes to which it was subject 
on account of the scale of domestic markets and the vigour of international competition. The 
commission produced forty-six individual reports on the various tariff heads. The significance of 
this inquiry lies not so much in the findings, perhaps predictable given the rival ideologies, but in 
the immense research, outreach and mobilisation effort that the inquiry represented.
 Contested legislation was the second major area of strategic policy making to which 
parliamentary inquiries made a particular contribution. The Bonus for Manufactures bill was a 
Protectionist initiative resisted by a strong faction of their erstwhile Labor supporters on the 
grounds that local iron production would prohibitively boost upstream costs. By contrast, the 
Navigation bill sponsored by the Reid–McLean government stumbled on Labor insistence on 
Australian crews and special conditions for coastal trade. These were both extensive inquiries 
that produced divided reports. Neither issue was finally resolved before 1909. Parliamentary 
inquiries as a vehicle for investigating contested legislation represented a role for parliament and 
MPs that has only recently been revived (e.g. GST inquiries).
 Finally, two inquiries involved oversight of major government activities: review of electoral 
administration in 1904 and the Post Office in 1908–1909. The Post Office review was almost on 
the scale of the tariff inquiry. It involved a comprehensive assessment of this key federal agency. 
A minority (Labor) report opposed the restriction of female occupations to typing, telegraphy and 
monitoring!
 To discount these inquiries because their recommendations were not wholly bipartisan 
or not accepted by the government is to misperceive the role and contribution of parliamentary 
inquiries in a pluralised political environment. In a multi-party context, parliamentarians became 
the ultimate arbiters of issues. Their judgements were critical to the resolution of these issues. 
Parliamentary inquiries brought interested and expert opinion, including departmental opinion, 
before MPs and a wider public. The inquiries acted as a ‘forcing device’ engaging stakeholders in 
a process of advocacy and (reciprocal) social learning. At the outset, different groups might have 
perceived themselves to be winners or losers or just interested parties. Through a process of 
public inquiry, all participants gained understanding about other perspectives and concerns and 
the opportunity thus opened up to develop more encompassing approaches. 
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 The fact that parliament was the setting for this process, that parliamentary opinion 
influenced the outcome and that votes on the floor of parliament counted, was vital for its impact 
on interest groups, departments and ministers. Further, parliamentary inquiries on strategic 
issues, matters that were more or less outside the immediate partisan contest, required MPs to 
seek common ground and, where this proved elusive, at least to isolate points of difference. The 
whole process occurred in the public domain with evidence sessions published and available 
for scrutiny and review. Particularly on strategic issues, such inquiries provided opportunities for 
departmental officers to be cross-examined in public and departmental opinion to be disclosed. 
 The structure of policy making in the period 1901 to 1909 was aligned to the society of the 
time. We don’t need to return to a three-party system to put into practice the lessons that can be 
learnt from this period of Australian political history. The range and significance of the strategic 
inquiries conducted over that period points to the value of a ‘strong’ parliamentary committee 
system. The chapters that follow show how the parliament could once again become the forum 
for the nation’s long-term strategic debates. Contemporary requirements for a renewal of a 
‘strong’ committee system are considered in the final chapter.
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